Given an importer (USA) and an HS6 product (electronic integrated circuits: processors and controllers, whether or not combined with memories, converters, logic circuits, amplifiers, c), the page ranks alternative suppliers on a composite friendshoring score that rewards capability and penalises cost, with a binary ally flag gating out comprehensively-sanctioned origins. World trade of this line in 2024 totalled $427.7B, of which roughly 0.0% came from countries flagged as hostile by the sanctions proxy described below.

How the friendshoring score is built

The composite score decomposes a supplier into capability, political alignment, and landed cost, in the spirit of Grossman, Helpman & Sabal (2024, 'Resilience in Vertical Supply Chains') on sourcing under geopolitical risk, and of Goldberg & Reed (2023, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity) on the empirical geography of friendshoring. The 'China shock' evidence of Autor, Dorn & Hanson (2013, American Economic Review103(6)) motivates treating single-origin concentration as a first-order risk, not a residual. Farrell & Newman (2019, 'Weaponized Interdependence,' International Security44(1)) frames why the ally factor enters multiplicatively rather than as a soft penalty. Aiyar, Chen, Ebeke, Garcia-Saltos, Gudmundsson, Ilyina, Kangur, Kunaratskul, Rodríguez, Ruta, Schulze, Soderberg & Trevino (2023, 'Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism,' IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/001) estimate that fragmentation into geopolitical blocs could cost the world economy between 0.2 and 7 per-cent of GDP, with low-income and small-open economies bearing the largest share, the macro ceiling for what this page prices at the HS6 level. Alfaro & Chor (2023, 'Global Supply Chains: The Looming 'Great Reallocation',' NBER WP 31661) show that US import reshuffling from China to Vietnam, Mexico and India is already tracking this bloc logic in the bilateral data, the direction the Scanner is built to help visualise.

friendshoring_score = capability × ally × ( 1 / cost )

  capability = norm(RCA_i) × norm(world_export_share_i)
  ally       = 1  if supplier is NOT on any consolidated sanctions list
             = 0  otherwise                   (crude hostility proxy)
  cost       = ( norm(unit_value_i) + 0.01 )
             × ( norm(distance_to_importer_i) + 0.01 )
             × ( 1 + applied_tariff_rate_i )

All factors are normalised to [0, 1] across the current supplier universe for this HS6 before combination, so the score is unit-free and rank-interpretable. BACI values are stored in thousands of USD and multiplied by 1,000 for display (CEPII BACI 202501 (retrieved 2026-04-28) convention). RCA is the Balassa (1965) index from the rca_matrix parquet.

Honest caveat on the ally factor. The ally score here is a VERY rough binary proxy. It flags supplier countries subject to comprehensive country-scope sanctions by OFAC, the EU, or the UN Security Council as of 2026-Q1 (IRN, PRK, CUB, SYR, RUS, BLR, MMR, VEN, AFG); every other origin receives ally = 1. This collapses a continuous, bilateral, and time-varying relationship into a binary. The canonical continuous alternative is the Bailey, Strezhnev & Voeten (2017, Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(2): 430-456) UN General Assembly ideal-point metric, which estimates each country-year's position on the liberal-order dimension from vote-by-vote roll-call data; bilateral affinity is then |θ_i(t) − θ_j(t)|. Aiyar et al. (2023) and the IMF bloc-mapping exercises build on exactly this series. Formal-alliance treaty membership (ATOP, Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell & Long 2002) is the binary complement.

Who are the friendly alternatives, ranked?

The top-20 non-dominant suppliers of HS 854231 in 2024, ranked by the composite score above. Bar colour encodes the ally flag: green for a friendly origin, amber for a flagged origin that survived the score despite ally = 0 (it should not: by construction ally = 0 zeroes the score; amber bars here serve as a visual audit that the filter is working).

Are the cheap suppliers also capable, and also friendly?

A cost-quality frontier for HS 854231 in 2024: unit value (BACI value over quantity, USD per metric ton) against world export share. Bubble size scales with great-circle distance to USA (CEPII Gravity V202411). Bubble colour encodes the ally flag. The ideal friendshoring candidate sits in the upper-left quadrant, low unit cost, high share, small bubble, and is coloured green.

How much dollar value could shift to friendly origins?

A first-order dollarisation of the shift opportunity. The first bar multiplies USA's total HS 854231 imports in 2024 by the world-export share of flagged origins, a BACI-mirror approximation, since partner-level HS6 bilateral flows are not loaded on this page. The second bar is the total HS 854231export value of friendly suppliers excluding the dominant origin: an upper bound on the supply that could, in principle, be redirected toward USA without new capacity.

By HS Section: dominant supplier vs. #1 friendly alternative

Rolled up across all HS6 lines in each of the 16 HS Sections present in the HS07 product catalogue, 2024. For each Section the table lists the largest exporter, whether that exporter is flagged by the sanctions proxy, and the highest-share alternative exporter that is NOT flagged (and is not the dominant supplier itself). Rows where the dominant origin is already friendly are the benign case; rows where the dominant is flagged and an alternative exists are the redirection candidates.

Full supplier detail, the shortlist underlying Figure 1

The top-20 friendly alternatives with every factor that enters the score, broken out so the ranking is auditable: world share, RCA, unit value, tariff into USA, distance, and the capability / cost decomposition. Tariff blanks mean the origin has no WITS-TRAINS filing in the latest year, typically because the line is MFN-zero or the partner is outside the WITS reporter universe. Distance blanks mean the origin is not in CEPII Gravity (small islands, BACI residual groupings).

Who uses this view and how

• Supply-chain strategy. Figure 1 is the first-pass shortlist for a CPO or procurement head looking to exit a hostile origin on this HS6 without giving up capability.
• CFO scenario planning. Figure 3 dollarises the exposure at risk and the upper-bound redirectable capacity. Where the two bars are close, the CFO should assume contracting costs; where they gap, reshoring or new capex is required.
• Government affairs. Figure 4 is the sector-level map of where the sanctions proxy most binds the current trade structure, and by implication where industrial-policy offers (CHIPS-style subsidies, IRA-style tax credits, the 2025 EU Critical Raw Materials Act procurement set-asides) should focus.

Policy read

The Scanner is the HS6-level instrument for a policy question that is now explicitly on the table. USTR Section 301 actions (2018, expanded 2024) and the October 2022 + October 2023 + December 2024 BIS export-control rounds on advanced semiconductors are the US side of a bloc-driven reshuffling that Alfaro & Chor (2023) and Aiyar et al. (2023) both document in the data: US imports from China as a share of US imports have fallen roughly 8 percentage points since 2018, with Vietnam, Mexico, and India picking up the slack, precisely the kind of redirection the composite score surfaces. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act (entered into force May 2024) sets a 65% single-country supply cap for strategic raw materials by 2030, which in the friendshoring frame is equivalent to binding the maximum of world_sharein Figure 1, if the dominant origin exceeds the cap, diversification becomes policy-mandated, not optional. The US IRA (2022) and CHIPS Act (2022) do the same for EV batteries and leading-edge logic with explicit 'foreign entity of concern' exclusions on the buyer side. India PLI and the IPEF supply-chain pillar (signed November 2023) are the coordinated-build side of the same architecture. For Bangladesh and other small, trade-dependent economies, the IMF's Aiyar et al. fragmentation estimate of 0.2-7% GDP loss is the downside scenario; Baldwin, Freeman & Theodorakopoulos (2023) make the counter-argument that hyper-specialisation is more resilient than it looks because so many inputs travel through deep-tier supplier networks. Either way, the HS6 view on this page is where the policy question becomes actionable.

References

• Aiyar, S., Chen, J., Ebeke, C., Garcia-Saltos, R., Gudmundsson, T., Ilyina, A., Kangur, A., Kunaratskul, T., Rodríguez, S. L., Ruta, M., Schulze, T., Soderberg, G., & Trevino, J. P. (2023). 'Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism. ' IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/001.
• Alfaro, L., & Chor, D. (2023). 'Global Supply Chains: The Looming 'Great Reallocation'.' NBER Working Paper 31661.
• Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2013). 'The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.' American Economic Review 103(6): 2121-2168.
• Bailey, M. A., Strezhnev, A., & Voeten, E. (2017). 'Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data.' Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(2): 430-456.
• Balassa, B. (1965). 'Trade Liberalisation and 'Revealed' Comparative Advantage.' The Manchester School 33(2): 99-123.
• Baldwin, R., Freeman, R., & Theodorakopoulos, A. (2023). 'Hidden Exposure: Measuring US Supply Chain Reliance.' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Fall.
• Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). 'Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.' International Security 44(1): 42-79.
• Goldberg, P. K., & Reed, T. (2023). 'Is the Global Economy Deglobalizing? And if So, Why? And What is Next?' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Spring: 347-396.
• Grossman, G. M., Helpman, E., & Sabal, A. (2024). 'Resilience in Vertical Supply Chains.' NBER Working Paper 31739.
• Head, K., & Mayer, T. (2014). 'Gravity Equations: Workhorse, Toolkit, and Cookbook.' In Handbook of International Economics, vol. 4, ch. 3.
• Hummels, D., & Klenow, P. J. (2005). 'The Variety and Quality of a Nation's Exports.' American Economic Review 95(3): 704-723.
• Leeds, B. A., Ritter, J. M., Mitchell, S. M., & Long, A. G. (2002). 'Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944.' International Interactions 28(3): 237-260.