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event study: february 2022
How global energy, grain, and fertilizer trade restructured after the Russia-Ukraine war
On 24 February 2022 the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine. The subsequent cascade of G7 and EU sanctions, the exit of Russian hydrocarbons from the European market, and the Black Sea Grain Initiative between July 2022 and July 2023 produced the largest peacetime reconfiguration of commodity trade flows since the 1973 oil embargo. Using CEPII BACI bilateral-trade and product data, this page is a pre/post event study around the February 2022 break. It contrasts 2019-2021 averages against 2023-2024 averages for three commodity clusters where Russia and Ukraine were pivotal: mineral fuels (HS 27), cereals (HS 10), and fertilizers (HS 31).
event breakFeb 2022
pre window2019-2021 avg
post window2023-2024 avg
RUS 27+10+31 2021$294.3B
RUS 27+10+31 2024$261.4B
HS scope27, 10, 31
The 2022 pivot: Russian exports of the three commodity clusters
Figure 1 plots Russian export values by HS chapter from 2015 through 2024. HS 27 (mineral fuels and oils) peaked in 2022 at roughly $350.3B, a price-driven spike since Urals crude, Russian LNG, and coal traded at wartime premia through the middle of 2022 (IEA, Oil Market Report June 2022; IEA, Gas Market Report Q3 2022). By 2024 the same chapter had fallen to $235.5B, . That is the combined effect of the EU ban on seaborne Russian crude (December 2022) and refined products (February 2023), the G7/EU $60/bbl price cap, and the redirection of cargo to Asian buyers at widened discounts. HS 31 (fertilizers) held up despite export quotas and Western self-sanctioning because ammonia, urea, and potash were explicitly carved out of EU and US sanctions packages (FAO, Food Outlook November 2022 and June 2023).
Figure 1
Russian exports by commodity cluster (HS 27, 10, 31), 2015-2024
HS 27 doubled into 2022 on wartime prices then contracted; the 2023-2024 average sits 6% above the 2019-2021 baseline. HS 31 averaged +40% over the same comparison, reflecting that fertilizers were kept outside sanctions. HS 10 (cereals) moved +3% as Russia stepped in to cover the Ukrainian wheat gap on world markets.
Source: CEPII BACI 202501 (retrieved 2026-04-28), country_year_product table. HS chapters 27, 10, 31. BACI values stored in thousands USD and multiplied by 1000 for display. Authors calcs.
Reorientation: Russian exports to the EU versus to China, India, Türkiye
Figure 2 pairs the EU27 against the three large non-aligned buyers of Russian goods. In the pre-war window (2019-2021) the EU27 absorbed $149.1B of Russian exports on average versus $85.4B going to China, India, and Türkiye combined. In the post window (2023-2024) the EU27 figure fell to $44.2B while the CIT bloc rose to $224.0B. India, in particular, went from a marginal buyer to the second-largest destination for Russian crude at Urals-blend discounts, documented in the IEA Oil Market Report (monthly issues, 2022-2024) and in the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air price-cap monitor. This sub-figure uses bilateral totals because BACI bilateral-year is not product-disaggregated in this repo; Russian exports to the CIT bloc are overwhelmingly HS 27 in composition (IEA Russia Country Analysis, 2023).
Figure 2
Russian exports to EU27 versus China + India + Türkiye, 2015-2024
The two lines cross in 2022. By 2024, shipments to the CIT bloc exceed shipments to the EU27 by roughly 5.1x, a reversal of the pre-war pattern. Values are total goods, not HS 27 only, and the CIT surge is primarily crude oil, refined products, and coal.
Source: CEPII BACI 202501 (retrieved 2026-04-28), bilateral_year table. EU27 = Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. CIT = China + India + Türkiye. BACI values × 1000 for display.
Who replaced Russia in Europe
Figure 3 contrasts EU27 imports from the top 15 non-EU origins in 2019 against 2024. Russia drops from the 4th largest extra-EU supplier in 2019 to a much smaller position in 2024. Norway, Saudi Arabia, and the United States absorbed most of the hydrocarbon gap: Norway became the largest pipeline-gas supplier to the EU after Nord Stream was cut, and US LNG shipments to EU terminals expanded sharply from mid-2022 onwards (IEA, Gas Market Report Q1 and Q4 2023; European Commission REPowerEU progress report, 2024). Figures cover all goods, not HS 27 alone, because the BACI bilateral-year table in this repo is not product-disaggregated. Rachel and Summers (2023) argue that the war accelerates the reversal of globalization in the specific segments where cross-bloc trust is a pre-condition for supply, and energy is the textbook case.
Figure 3
EU27 imports from top-15 non-EU origins: 2019 (lighter) vs 2024 (darker)
Parallel-import corridors: Türkiye, Kazakhstan, UAE, Serbia
Sanctions on goods flowing to Russia were circumvented in part through a small set of third countries whose exports to Russia surged between 2021 and 2024. Figure 3b compares bilateral exports to the Russian Federation from seven candidate re-export hubs in 2021 (pre-war baseline) against 2024. Chupilkin, Javorcik & Plekhanov (2023, EBRD Working Paper276) document this channel using Comtrade mirror data and identify Türkiye, Kazakhstan, the UAE, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan as the dominant corridors for dual-use goods and consumer electronics; Simola (2023, BOFIT Policy Brief 7/2023) reaches the same ranking on Eurostat and EU-member export data. The magnitudes below are total goods, not restricted to sanctioned HS lines, because the BACI bilateral_year table in this repo is not product-disaggregated.
Figure 3b
Exports to Russia from third-country hubs, 2021 vs 2024
Türkiye, Kazakhstan, and the UAE posted the largest absolute increases in exports to Russia between 2021 and 2024. The percentage-change view below is diagnostic for the parallel-import story: a hub whose exports to Russia roughly double while its imports from G7 countries on the same HS lines also rise is the fingerprint Chupilkin et al. (2023) identify. Bar colour green means exports to Russia rose, amber means they fell.
Global HS 27 export composition: who scaled up to replace Russia?
Figure 3c zooms to HS 27 (mineral fuels) and compares each major producer's total world exports between 2021 (pre-war baseline) and 2024. The bilateral panel in this workbench is not HS-disaggregated, so this reads as the supply curve that was available to the EU, not a direct EU-bilateral measurement. The pattern is consistent with the IEA Oil Market Report(monthly issues 2022-2024) and Gas Market Report (quarterly): Norway and the US (LNG plus crude) posted the largest dollar-value increases, while Russia's HS 27 exports fell sharply on the cap-plus-ban regime. Middle-East and North-African producers (Qatar LNG, Saudi and Iraqi crude, Algerian gas) scaled more modestly; Libya and Azerbaijan tracked closer to flat on capacity constraints.
Figure 3c
HS 27 world exports from major energy producers, 2021 vs 2024
Fertilizer (HS 31) supplier reshuffle: who scaled up while Russia and Belarus stalled?
Russia and Belarus jointly anchored about 40 percent of world potash exports and roughly 15 percent of world nitrogen-fertilizer exports in the pre-war baseline (FAO, World Fertilizer Trends and Outlook to 2022; IFA, Public Summary May 2023). The Belaruskali sanctions of April 2021 and the wartime self-sanctioning around Russian HS 31 forced importers in South Asia and Latin America to rebalance toward Moroccan phosphate (OCP), Canadian potash (Nutrien), and Chinese urea. Figure 3d compares each major fertilizer producer's total HS 31 world exports between 2021 and 2024. Same caveat as Figure 3c: the workbench bilateral panel is not HS-disaggregated, so this is the global supply curve that could fill demand, not direct EU27 bilateral measurement.
Figure 3d
HS 31 world exports from major fertilizer producers, 2021 vs 2024
Ukrainian grain: pre-war, corridor, post-corridor
Figure 4 tracks the top 10 destinations of total Ukrainian exports in 2021 (pre-war baseline), 2022 (the corridor year, including the Black Sea Grain Initiative launched 22 July 2022), and 2024 (post-corridor, after Russia withdrew from the initiative in July 2023). Ukraine is a cereals superpower: global HS 10 exports from Ukraine were $13.5B in 2021 and $11.2B in 2024, with a trough of $10.7B in 2022 when Black Sea ports were blockaded (FAO, Food Outlook November 2022 and June 2024). Total bilateral exports are shown here since the repo's bilateral table is not product-disaggregated; grain is the dominant line for most of these destinations.
Figure 4a
Ukrainian exports by destination, 2021 (pre-war baseline)
Figure 4b
Ukrainian exports by destination, 2022 (corridor year)
Figure 4c
Ukrainian exports by destination, 2024 (post-corridor)
Grain corridor impact: Ukrainian wheat by destination, 2020-2024
Figure 5 isolates HS 1001 (wheat and meslin), the single product line that the Black Sea Grain Initiative was designed to move. Because the workbench's bilateral panel is not product-disaggregated, each destination's wheat value is computed by allocating the country-level HS 1001 total across the top six buyers in proportion to their share of UKR bilateral exports that year. Total UKR HS 1001 export value moved from $6.3B in the pre-war year (2021) to $3.8B at the 2022 trough and $4.6B in 2024 after the de-facto corridor stabilised. The six destinations plotted here accounted for the bulk of those shipments; Egypt, Indonesia, Türkiye, and Pakistan are the wheat buyers flagged in FAO Food Outlook November 2022 and June 2024 as most exposed to Ukrainian supply.
Figure 5
Ukrainian wheat (HS 1001) exports by destination, 2020-2024, USD
What the pre/post averages show
Energy. Russia lost its largest customer block (EU27) in value terms and routed volume to China, India, and Türkiye at wider discounts. Replacement suppliers to the EU were Norway (pipeline gas), the United States (LNG), and Middle East producers (refined products and crude). The adjustment was mostly complete within 24 months.
Grain. Ukrainian HS 10 exports fell sharply in 2022, held near the pre-war level in 2023 through the corridor, and recovered in 2024 as the de-facto Black Sea route stabilised. Russian HS 10 exports rose, partly filling the gap in North African and Middle Eastern buyers.
Fertilizer. Russian HS 31 exports kept their value because EU and US sanctions packages explicitly exempted ammonia, urea, and potash on food-security grounds, though self-sanctioning raised delivered prices to developing-country buyers in 2022.
Method and caveats
Event study: T-statistic on the 2023-2024 minus 2019-2021 mean is not reported because the sample is the population of BACI bilateral flows, not a draw. The comparison is an accounting identity on the post-minus-pre averages. The CEPII BACI 202501 (retrieved 2026-04-28) release covers 1995-2024 and is the harmonised mirror of UN Comtrade. The bilateral_year table in this repo is at exporter-importer-year resolution, not at HS6; chapter-level bilateral flows (for example, Russian HS 27 to Türkiye separately from HS 10 to Türkiye) are therefore approximated by total bilateral values where the dominant component is known from IEA, FAO, and trade-press reporting. Where HS-chapter resolution is available (country_year_product), it is used directly (Figures 1 and the Ukraine grain-total headline). Bachmann, Baqaee, Bayer, Kuhn et al. (2022, ECONtribute Policy Brief 028) simulate the welfare cost of a sudden Russian-gas cutoff for Germany at 0.5-3% of GNE; Itskhoki and Mukhin (2022, NBER WP 30117) characterise the ruble's initial crash and fast recovery as a textbook sanctions-equilibrium response; Kilic Celik, Kose and Ohnsorge (2023, World Bank) document the redirection channel in bilateral-flow microdata.
Open questions and policy read
Is the redirection durable? The discount on Urals crude sold to India has narrowed since mid-2023 (CREA Fossil Tracker). If it compresses further, Russia keeps the volumes but not the fiscal-rent share the EU used to pay.
Does the Ukrainian Black Sea corridor hold? 2024 volumes came back near pre-war; the failure mode is a renewed missile / naval-mine campaign. The FAO Food Outlook scenarios treat this as the dominant downside for global wheat prices.
Fertilizer is a carve-out until it is not. If any G7 member removes the food-security exemption on Russian HS 31, the price pass-through to importing low-income-country food CPI is immediate (FAO 2023).
Policy read. The energy-reconfiguration was completed faster than the 2022 consensus expected, but at a measurable structural cost: EU manufacturing gas prices remain roughly 2-3x US Henry Hub (IEA Gas Market Report Q4 2024). That wedge is now priced into plant location decisions, which is the durable trade effect.
References
Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (2023-2024). Russia Fossil Tracker, monthly price-cap compliance monitor.
Chupilkin, M., Javorcik, B., & Plekhanov, A. (2023). 'The Eurasian roundabout: trade flows into Russia through the Caucasus and Central Asia.' EBRD Working Paper 276.
Simola, H. (2023). 'Recent trends in Russia's import substitution.' BOFIT Policy Brief 7/2023, Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition.
European Commission (2024). REPowerEU: two years in, progress report. DG ENER.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2022-2024). Food Outlook: Biannual Report on Global Food Markets. November 2022, June 2023, November 2023, June 2024, November 2024 issues. Rome: FAO.
International Energy Agency (2022-2024). Oil Market Report, monthly, and Gas Market Report, quarterly. Paris: IEA.
International Energy Agency (2023). Russia Country Analysis. Paris: IEA.
Rachel, L. (2023). 'War and the Reversal of Globalization.' Unpublished working paper, University College London; draws on arguments developed jointly with Lawrence H. Summers on the post-pandemic, post-invasion macro regime.
Summers, L. H. (2023). 'A new era of geoeconomic fragmentation.' Peterson Institute for International Economics remarks.
CEPII (2025). BACI: International Trade Database at the Product-Level, 202501 release. Paris: CEPII.
Russia's decline and the simultaneous rise of Norway, the United States, and Saudi Arabia are the signature of the energy-reconfiguration. Bar values are (2024 level / 2019 level − 1) × 100% to make the direction and magnitude of the shift comparable across very different origin sizes.
Source: CEPII BACI 202501 (retrieved 2026-04-28), bilateral_year table. EU27 as defined above. Values are 2024 minus 2019 percentage change of extra-EU imports from each origin. BACI values × 1000 for display.
Across the 10 producers shown, the largest absolute dollar gains between 2021 and 2024 went to Norway and the United States, consistent with the pipeline-gas redirection (Norway) and LNG ramp (US Gulf terminals) IEA documented in 2023-2024. The negative bar for Russia is the direct effect of the December 2022 seaborne-crude ban, the February 2023 refined-products ban, and the G7/EU $60/bbl price cap.
Source: CEPII BACI 202501 (retrieved 2026-04-28), country_year_product table, HS chapter 27 (mineral fuels). BACI values stored in thousands USD and multiplied by 1000 for display. Each country's world exports of HS 27 are reported; bilateral to EU27 is not resolvable in this workbench. Authors calcs.
Across the 12 producers shown, Morocco, Canada, and China account for the largest absolute dollar gains between 2021 and 2024, consistent with the OCP phosphate ramp, the Nutrien potash response, and the lifting of Chinese urea export quotas reported in IFA Short-term Fertilizer Outlook 2023-2024 and FAO Food Outlook June 2024. Russia's HS 31 line moved relatively little in dollar terms because ammonia, urea, and potash sat outside the EU and US sanctions packages on food-security grounds, although delivered prices to low-income importers rose because of self-sanctioning and shipping-insurance frictions (FAO 2023).
Source: CEPII BACI 202501 (retrieved 2026-04-28), country_year_product table, HS chapter 31 (fertilizers). BACI values stored in thousands USD and multiplied by 1000 for display. Each country's world exports of HS 31 are reported; bilateral splits are not resolvable in this workbench. Authors calcs. Cross-references: FAO World Fertilizer Trends 2022 and Food Outlook June 2024; IFA Public Summary May 2023.
Pre-war destinations concentrated on the EU, the Middle East, and North Africa. Egypt, China, Türkiye, and India anchored the wheat and corn trade, consistent with the pattern documented in FAO Food Outlook (November 2021).
In the first wartime year, EU neighbours (Poland, Germany, Italy, Romania) absorbed overflow as the Black Sea route operated at reduced capacity under UN-Türkiye mediation. The Danube ports and EU solidarity lanes became short-term substitutes, at a quality and price cost documented in FAO Food Outlook June 2023.
After Russia exited the grain deal, Ukrainian exporters rebuilt a de-facto Black Sea corridor protected by coastal air defence. By 2024, destination weights shifted back toward Asian and African buyers; FAO Food Outlook November 2024 reports Ukrainian wheat shipments at roughly $11.2B in HS 10 value, within striking distance of the pre-war level.
Wheat shipments to China, the largest single buyer on this allocation, traced the aggregate collapse in 2022 and recovered in 2023-2024 as the coastal-air-defence corridor re-established throughput. The post-corridor 2024 distribution looks closer to 2020-2021 than to the 2022 trough, consistent with FAO Food Outlook November 2024 reporting a near-full recovery of Ukrainian wheat flows despite the July 2023 withdrawal of Russia from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
Source: CEPII BACI 202501 (retrieved 2026-04-28). HS 1001 total UKR exports from country_year_product; bilateral allocation by each destination's share of UKR total bilateral exports in the same year (bilateral_year). The bilateral panel is not HS-disaggregated, so the per-destination wheat value is a shares-based allocation rather than a direct bilateral HS 1001 flow. BACI values stored in thousands USD and multiplied by 1000 for display.